Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission : Brief of Respondent/Defendant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Commission : Brief of Respondent/Defendant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark K. Buchi, David K. Detton, Richard G. Wilkins; Holme, roberts, and Owen; Attorneys for
Petitioner/Plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson; Utah Attorney General; Stephen G. Schwendiman; Division Chief; L.A. Dever;
Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 880251.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2215
BRlEfi 
UTAH SUPREME COURt 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
s assess * * * * * * * * * 
-000O000-
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORP. 
Petitioner/Plaintiff 
v. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT 
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) 
Division Chief 
L. A. DEVER (#0875) 
Assistant Attonrey General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff 
Mark K. Buchi 
David K. Detton 
Richard G. Wilkins 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
r"r k fl i* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— -000O000 — — 
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORP. 
Petitioner/Plaintiff 
v. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) 
Division Chief 
L. A. DEVER (#0875) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Mark K. Buchi 
David K. Detton 
Richard G. Wilkins 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents iii 
Table of Authorities iv 
Statement of Issues. . • • ,vii 
Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Case 1 
Nature of Case 1 
Relief Sought on Appeal .2 
Statement of Facts 2 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Tax Commission. .3 
Summary of Argument 5 
Argument I 
AMAX'S PROPERTY SHOULD BE CENTRALLY ASSESSED, NOT 
COUNTY ASSESSED, BECASUE ITS PROPERTY IS 
"APPURTENANT" TO THE MINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-5-3 4 
Argument II 
AMAX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 20% REDUCTION IN ITS TAXABLE 
VALUE UNDER ANY CONCEIVABLE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES 17 
Conclusion 26 
Addendum to Brief of Resondent 28 
Appendix 1: AMAX Magnesium v. Property Tax Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, No. 86-0203, at 4 (December 
21, 1987). 
Appendix 2: Utah Const, art. XIII, S 2(10); Utah Const, art. 
XIII, S 3(1); Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11. 
Appendix 3: Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-602(3) (1986); Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986); Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3 
(1986); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1)(1986); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(3)(ii) (1988). 
Appendix 4: Maps of ponds, dikes, and plants. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Amos v. Bennionf 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969) 11 
Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assoc, Inc.y 508 P.2d 1179 (Utah 
1973) 11 
Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W. 1094 (Tex. App. 
1917) 12, 13 
Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cty., 659 P.2d 1030 
(Utah 1983) 17 
Brown v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 177 N.Y.S. 618 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1919) . 
14 
Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 
1982) 23 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 U. 314, 209 P.2d 739 
(1949) 8-9 
Denver v. Center for Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299 
(Colo. 1985) 11 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 592 P.2d 965 (1975) . . 
..26 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967) 14 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971). . . .6 
Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946) 25 
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1986) 24 
Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah 1987) 13, 14, 15 
Humphervs v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304 (1891) 11 
In re Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New 
York, 
243 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1930) 12 
Kingsway R. & M. Corp. v. Kingsway Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 
265 (App. Div. 1928) 12 
La Rue v. Green County Bank, 166 S.W.2d 1044 (Term. 1942). . . 11 
Maricopa County v. North Central Development Co., 566 P.2d 688 
(Ariz. App. 1977) 25 
McClenaqn v. McEacher, 34 S.E. 627 (S.C. 1899) 12 
McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980) 21 
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder et al, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) 15 
Morton International/ Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Co., 495 P.2d 31 (1972) 8 
Mt. Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 73 P. 826 (Cal. 1903) . . . . 12 
Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City Schools, 377 P.2d 490 
(1962) 6,7 
Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 
681 P. 2d 184 (Utah 1984) 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 
Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983) 11 
Utah State Road Commission v. Miya 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). . 11 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) 6, 7 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982) 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. XIII, S 2(10) 5, 21 
Utah Const, art. XIII, S 3(1) 5, 21 
Utah Const, art. XIII, §11 17 
-v-
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-602(3) (1987) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-1 (1986) 5, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986) 
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 29 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (1986) 5, 17, 18, 20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-13-77 (1953) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (3) (ii) (1988) 1 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
R. UTAH S.Ct. 14 1 
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
Black's Law Dictionary 38 (5th ed. 1979) 10 
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979) 8 
Black's Law Dictionary 310 (5th ed. 1979) 11 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1296 (1985) 14 
Webster's Secretrarial Handbook 287 (1983) 16 
-vi-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether AMAX's property is "appurtenant- to a mine 
within the meaning of U.C.A. S 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986) and therefore 
properly assessed by the State Tax Commission, or whether AMAX's 
plant is properly assessed by the Tooele County assessor under 
U.C.A. S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1986). 
2. Whether AMAX's even though its property is centrally 
assessed, is nonetheless entitled to a 20% reduction in the value 
of its real property (which 20% reduction is made available to 
county-assessed property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5) by 
operation of the uniformity provisions of Article XIII sections 2 
and 3 of the Utah Constitution 
-vii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
v. 




BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
STATMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this action 
pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3(e)(ii) (1988), Utah Code Ann- S 59-1-602(3) 
(1987), Utah Supreme Court Rule 14. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff/Petitioner, hereinafter AMAX, has 
appealed the Formal Decision of the Tax Commission entered 
against AMAX's personal property located in Tooele County, Utah 
Section 59-1-602(3) was repealed, however, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-22(2) the statutes and rules governing the 
Tax Commission's actions and review, and any judicial review that 
were in effect on December 31, 1987 govern all agency 
adjudicative proceedings. The Tax Commission's hearing took 
place on June 3rd and June 4th of 1987. All statutes in this 
case that are cited and all current codifications of the statutes 
are listed in full in the Repondent's Addendum. 
by the Utah Tax Commission. 
Relief Sought On Appeal 
The Plaintiff/Petitioner, AMAX, seeks on appeal that 
its property be locally assessed under § 59-5-4.5 or in the 
alternative that S 59-5-4.5 be held unconstitutional as applied 
to the assessment of Petitioner's property. 
Statement Of Facte 
The tax year in question is 1986. The taxed property 
in question is AMAX's property consisting of (a) a plant 
comprised of personal property and improvements and land owned in 
fee by AMAX (the "plantM) and (b) a series of evaporation ponds, 
comprised of improvements and equipment (the ponds). 
The plant is a magnesium manufacturing facility. The 
production of magnesium is accomplished by extracting magnesium 
through various chemical and electrical processes from brine 
containing magnesium chloride. Brine is converted from salt 
water through a seven year process of evaporation. AMAX can 
convert brine from salt water through a series of earthen dikes, 
2 
and ponds, impounding salt water from the Great Salt Lake. 
The Plant is a large manufacturing facility, covering almost a 
square mile of land, situated in the center of approximately 
seven square mile of land owned in fee by AMAX. Through various 
chemical and electrial processes, the Plant produces magnesium, a 
metal not found in a natrual state, from concentrated brine 
solutions. Brief for Petitioner/Plaintiff at 6, AMAX Corporation 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251. 
-2-
The ponds consist of a series of earthen dikes, 
together with related improvements and equipment. According to 
Mr. Frazer of AMAX, the closest pond to the plant is the holding 
pond, located approximately 1/4 mile from the plant, the farthest 
being at the end of the 15 mile brine line (TR 120). The total 
3 
plant and pond area is approximately 70 square miles. The land 
on which the plant is located is owned by AMAX, the pond areas 
are leased. AMAX, through a seven-year process of evaporation 
from the Ponds, obtains a metal product from the brine and, 
therefore, is effectively mining brine from the Great Salt Lake 
and then extracting the mineral magnesium from the salt brine. 
The brine is harvested from the southernmost portion of the ponds 
and transported to the plant. Since a breach of earthen dikes in 
1983, the concentrated brine harvested from the ponds has been 
insufficient to supply the needs of the plant and AMAX has 
purchased concentrated brine from another supplier. According to 
Mr. Tom Frazer of AMAX, the brine is purchased from Kaiser in 
Wendover, Utah (TR 89), near the Bonneville Salt Flats, and as he 
pointed out, "it is the: same brineM (TR 142). A reference to the 
fact that the Great Salt Lake and the Great Salt Lake Desert are 
geologically related. 
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The Tax Commission 
In 1986, AMAX's property was assessed by the Property 
Tax Division of the Commission (hereinafter Division). The 
See Appendix 4 for maps from Bechtel Report (Ex. 24, p. 9) and 
AMAX (Ex. 2A) 
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Division originally assessed the value of AMAX's property as of 
January 1, 1986, to be $84,332,150. Pursuant to an informal 
hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Utah Tax Commission 
(hereinafter Commission) reduced the assessed value of AMAX's 
property to $78,312,895 by its Informal Decision dated December 
1, 1986 (TR 536-538). On January 2, 1987, AMAX petitioned the 
Commission under Tax Commission Rule A12-01-l:4, for a plenary 
formal hearing on the fair market value of AMAX's property. 
Following the formal hearing of June 3rd and 4th, 1987, the 
Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision, dated December 21, 1987 (Appendix 2). The 
Commission ordered that the Division adjust the tax to reflect 
Pond maintenance costs as expenses, rather than capital 
investments, but affirmed the balance of the Division's 
assessment as established by the Informal Decision. 
On January 21, 1988, AMAX filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration. The petition requested the Commission to 
reconsider its position that the Plant was properly assessable by 
the Commission as "appurtenant to" a mine within the language of 
4 
U.C.A. S 59-5-3. The Commission denied AMAX's Petition for 
Reconsideration on May 31, 1988. AMAX's now petitions this Court 
to review the Commission's May 31, 1988, Decision and Order and 
the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Final 
Decision dated December 21, 1987. (Appendix 1) 
U.C.A. S 59-5-3, the statute at the time the issue arose, is 
now codified at S 59-2-201. 
6'DMMAk ARGUMENT 
AMAX 
5-4.5. First, AMAX's property is "appurtenant* dne 
withii meaning of the Utah Code and therefore, must be 
assessed by the State Tax Commission. 
(1986). Since, AMAX's property is centrally assessed property 
o take 80% of the value IF 
its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of
 assessmeiiL ih 
Code Ann. $§ 59-5-3 and 59-5-4.5 (1986). 
to AMAX's property and 
the refusal to apply it in calculating the fair market value c I 
AMAX's property does not violate Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 
Section 
2(10) that intangble property be taxed in the manner and » the 
E x t€ i l: provided by the Legislature has not been violated because 
the Tax Commission has taxed AMAX's propei< ", " • • " " "." " ,IJI 
I as directed by the Legislature, The guarantee of uniformity 
pjY.v i lit 1 i1 I I 11 III" I I , S v i o l a t e d by t h e ^ 
Commission because the Legislature has determined that 
is sustained by assessing centrally assessed property at a 
ill U " t : j i i 'Pint, i n ml 1 IL i Il I" iii 1 II "if assessed proper t The Tax 
Commission, as mandated by the Legislature, has assessed AMAX's 
Plant at "100% of its fair market value, Utah Code Ann. SS 59-
5-1 (i98t 
c 
The full text of Article XIII, sections 2(10) and section 3 
(1) of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated SS 59-1-1, 
59-5-1 and 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1986) are set forth in ADoendix 2 and 
Appendix 3 
ARGUMENT I 
AMAX'S PROPERTY SHOULD BE CENTRALLY ASSESSED, NOT 
COUNTY ASSESSED, BECAUSE ITS PROPERTY IS "APPURTENANT" TO 
THE MINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-3. 
The conclusion drawn by the Commission that AMAX's property 
is "appurtenant" to the mine is obvious from a reading of the 
statute and from an application of several fundamental rules of 
statutory construction. Section S 59-5-3, in pertinent part, 
states that the Tax Commission shall assess the following: 
[A]11 mines and mining claims and valuable 
deposits, including lands containing coal or 
hydrocarbons, non-metalliferous minerals 
underlying land the surface of which is owned by 
a person other than the owner of such minerals, 
all machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims and the value of any 
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining 
claims or mining property for other than mining 
purposes; must be assessed by the state tax 
commission as hereinafter provided. • • • For 
the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction 
works, and smelters used exclusively for the 
purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a 
mine or mining claim by the owner therof shall 
be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or 
mining claim through the same is not upon such 
mine or mining claim. 
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the words of 
the statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole and not 
piecemeal. See Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City Schools, 
377 P.2d 490 (1962). A second rule of statutory construction is 
"that the terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with 
usually accepted meanings." Utah County v, Orem Cityf 699 P.2d 
707, 709 (Utah 1985); accord Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 
P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 1971). A third rule of statutory 
construction is in construing legislative enactments, the 
reviewer
 a s s Unte S that ea ch term i n the statute was used 
advisedly, thus the statutory words are read literally, unless 
:l is • " unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
FIRST RULE 
Section 59-5-3 should be read as a whole. See Peay m 
Section § 59-5-3 read as a whole would centrally 
assess AMAX's property roperly if- upi i 11 ^  
property is "appurtenant* * the mine; or the property is used 
i"">n, I in 1 i" II reducing ore by AMAX from a mine, 
even though it is not physically "appurtenan~ e 
possibilities are whether (1) AMAX's plant : "upon" ) 
the propei tj J ap j: n: i I .< ^ i u iii i I , I '" I e < =i I u Lake and thereby 
should be centrally assessed, and/or i the property is used by 
the owner exclusively for the purpose of reducing ore from a 
m i n e . The C o m m i s s i o n 11 i:oiitM, i in i in IMI.1I in i i in i in i in F i n d i n g s " 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision that "the subject 
p] ai I !:: :l s app • irtenant to the mine, i e , (iiifvif Sn it. Lake, ponds 
from which the minerals were extracted.11 AMAX Mac* 
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, No. 86 
Commission's conclusion is 
supported by the analysis in the subsequent paragraphs. 
SECOND RULE 
Section 59-5-3's terms should be interpreted with their 
usual meaning. See Utah County, 699 P 2d at ?09 AMAX completely 
ignores this rule by suggesting that "appurtenant" can never mean 
'-• i ii in ! mi i the context of S 59-5-3. See Petitioner's Brief 
f AMAX' s interpretation I a 14*\ 1' I, e J 1 a t I angauge 
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of S 59-5-3 is wrong. Furthermore, many of AMAX's synonyms for 
"appurtenant- mean "adjacent- or within the same proximity. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines -appurtenant- as: 
Belonging to; accessory or incident to; adjunctt 
annexed to; answering to accessorium in the 
civil law. . . . A thing is deemed to be 
incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by 
right used with the land for its benefit, as in 
the case of a way, or water-course, or of a 
passage for light, air or heat from or across 
the land of another. 
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979). The words "adjunct" 
and -annexed to- which Black's accepts as synonymous with 
-appurtenant" are likewise the same words ordinarily used to 
define "adjacent." Moreover, in this context, the word 
-appurtenant" should be understood to mean "adjacent- or adjunct" 
because the Great Salt Lake and the brines in the lake are state 
property that cannot pass as -appurtenances" (as that term 
ordinarily understood in real estate) with any personalty AMAX-
may convey. Neither are the brines as such subject to taxation 
as property. See Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 495 P.2d 31 (1972), and Utah Code Ann. S 59-
13-77 (1953), as amended. The Utah Legislature has made an 
exception for the brines of the Great Salt Lake. However, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the legislature, by making that 
exemption, sought to exempt mining property on the Great Salt 
Lake from central assessment. The case law is precisely to the 
contrary. In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 U. 314, 
209 P.2d 739 (1949) the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
It will be noted that Sec. 8-5-3, U.C.A. 1942 
[the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3] the 
value of any surface use made of non-
8-
metalliferous mining claims or mining property 
for other than mining purposes must be assessed 
by the State Tax Commission. Hence, it would 
seem that even if the surface were developed 
into residential property so long as the 
character of the subsurface were mineral, the 
State Tax Commission and not the county assessor 
must assess the surface value as well as the 
mineral or mining value of the subsurface. It 
is not necessary to decide which of the two 
agencies would assess if the subsurface lost 
character as mineral lands. All we need now 
hold is that until there is proof that the land 
has lost its character as mineral land or mining 
property it is assessable by the State Tax 
Commission. 
J [ I J , i in mi "i mi I • 
The meaning the word •  appurtenant 
Tooele County's closing arguements at the Formal Hearing, which 
at €i • i ii; • ::  i: I::l: 1 i: epe a t:ii i ig here •: _ . 
The statute does have two words. It has upon, 
which I think is clear; a that is, on the 
property itself, on the mine or the mining 
claim. It goes on to state that It can be 
either on or appurtenant. 
Out at Rowley there is no way that the 
manufacturing process can be on the mine or 
mining claims, since the mine or mining claim is 
the water 3o that's why the word appurtenant 
was added *-hat statute. 
Over the evening I had an opportunity to turn 
to "Words and Phrases," which is judicial 
construction and definition of words. In "Words 
and Phrases," it defines -~ it has several court 
cases which define appurtenant, and it is much 
broader than Mr. Buchi's initial opening 
comments and statements 
Let
 m e react j u s t a few 0f those. Here is one 
case which says, 'Appurtenant means belonging 
to, accessory or incident to, adjuct, appended, 
annexed to.' Here is another. 'The word 
Appurtenant means attached to or belonging to.' 
In the law, the term appurtenant usually means 
something appertainting to another thing as 
principal and passing as incident to such 
principal. 
A body of water, you bring water out, and you 
process it right there. 
TR 307. Several important comments should be made about Mr. 
Elton's closing statement. First, the word "appurtenant" in S 
59-5-3 should be read as meaning "adjacent toH or "adjunct to" in 
this context because the property, in his view, cannot possibly 
be "upon" the mine. In this case, the "mine" is the water of the 
Great Salt Lake. Second, the word "adjunct" which Mr. Elton 
cites as one accepted meaning of the word "appurtenant," means 
"added or joined". Obviously, "added or joined" can mean 
sustantially the same thing as "adjacent". The word "adjacent" 
is defined 
Black's Law Dictionary 38 (5th ed. 1979) as: 
Lying near or close to; sometimes, contiguous; 
neighboring. Adjacent implies that the two 
objects are not widely separated, though they 
may not actually touch, Harrison v. Guilford 
County, 218 N.C. 718, 12 S.E.2d 269, while 
adjoining imports that they are so joined or 
united to each other that no third object 
intervenes, (citation omitted). And "adjunct" 
is defined as, "Something added to another, but 
in a subordinate, auxiliary, or dependent 
position. jCd. at 40. The words "adjunct" and 
"annexed to" are synonymous with "appurtenant," 
therefore, in this context, the word 
"appurtenant" should be understood to mean 
"adjunct" or "adjacent." 
Furthermore, the definition of "appurtenant" is best defined 
by cases that have decided whether corporeal property is 
•appurtenant" to, rather than cases that have determined if 
incorporeal property is "appurtenant." Incorporeal property and 
corporeal property are defined as: 
Such as affects the senses, and may be seen and 
handled, as opposed to incorporeal property, 
10-
which cannot be seen or handled, and exists only 
in contemplation* Thus a house is corporeal, 
but the annual rent payable for its occupation 
is incorporeal. Corporeal property, if movable, 
capable of manual transfer: if immovable, 
possession of it may be delivered up. But 
incorporeal property cannot be so transferred, 
but some other means must be adopted for its 
transfer, of which the most usual is an 
instrument in writing. 
110 (5th ed. 1979). AMAX's property is 
corporeal property because i1: affects the senbt 
seen and handled.H By defintion the property is not 
" 1 1,'ui |IIJI »:ja l (in '• |ji i l I; l i n r p o r e a l p r o p e r t y . C a s e s AMAX c i t e s 
as defining "appurtenant" are distinguishable because they ait 
either defining incoroperal property as appurtenant to and/or 
factually distinguit present fact situation, 
therefore, they cases are inapplicable. 
3
 See Petitioner's Brief at 22 nn.24-25. AMAX'S incorpDreal 
cases are: Roundy v. Coombs# 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983), "water 
rights appurtenant to land." Petitioner's Brief at 22 n.24; Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), "The 
rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the 
land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property 
rights forming part of the owner's estate." jto. at 928; Aspen 
Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assoc, Inc., 508 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1973), "In 
the instant case, plaintiff owns no real property within the 
tract and, therefore, has no right to interfere or control the 
easements appurtenant to the realty therein." Id. at 308; Amos v. 
Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969), "mineral rights appurtenant to 
land." Petitioner's Brief at 22 n.24(quoting Amos v. Bennion, 
456 P.2d 172 (1969); Humpherys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304 (1891), 
"the term includes easements and servitudes used and enjoyed with 
the lands for whose benefit they were created." Petitioner's 
Brief at 22, n.25; Denver v. Center for Performing Arts v. 
Briqqs, 696 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1985), "appurtenances generally 
refers to intangible rights, such as water rights or easements, 
that necessarily must be conveyed for beneficial use of land." 
Petitioner's Brief at 22, n.25; La Rue v. Green County Bank, 166 
S.W.2d 1044 (Term. 1942), "appurtenance means that which belongs 
to something else, or something belonging to another thing as 
principal and passing as incident to it, as a right of way or 
other easement to land." Petitioner's Brief at 22, n.25; Mt. 
Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 73 P 826 (CaJ , 1 903), "passage for 
-11 
AMAX cites Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W. 
1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) , as their primary source for their 
interpretation of Happurtenant." AMAX states: 
Upon forecolosure, the purchaser at the trustee's 
sale argued that a seedhouse — erected by the 
cottonseed company on land some miles away from 
the factory — was 'appurtenant' to the property 
covered by the deed of trust. The court rejected 
this assertion, reasoning that an 'appurtenance' 
is '[a] thing belonging to another thing as 
principal, and which passes as incident to the 
principal thing.' 193 S.W. at 1095. The court 
concluded that there was no such relationship 
between the factory and a seedhouse built upon a 
separate parcel of land. 'Certainly no one 
reading the description as set forth in the deed 
of trust upon which appellee's right is based 
could reasonably conclude that a seedhouse a 
number of miles in the country could be held to 
be appurtenance to the lots . . . upon which the 
oil mill was situated. Id. 
Petitioner's Brief at 24. AMAX incorrectly applies Balcar to the 
present fact situation by not stating why the seedhouse was not 
appurtenant to the factory. The reason the seedhouse was not 
appurtenant to the factory was it was not essential to the 
operations of the factory. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
states: 
Note 'b.' same volume [Note 33b, Volume 4, Corpus Juris, p. 
1467], says: 
Cont. light, air or heat from or across the land of another." 
Petitioner's Brief at 23, n.25; McClenaqn v. McEacherf 34 S.E. 
627 (S.C. 1899), "the word 'appurtenant' necessarily involves the 
idea that the owner of a dominant tenement has some legal right 
in the premises appurtenant to it." Peitioner's Brief at 23, 
n.25. 
Those cases that are factually distinguishable are: In re 
Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New Yorky 243 
N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1930) (land cannot pass as ••appurtenant" to 
land exept in case of land under water); Kingsway R. & M. Corp. 
v. Kingsway Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 265 (App. Div. 1928)(land 
never passes as appurtenance to land). 
12-
'The true test as to whether a thing 
Is an incident or appurtenance seems to 
be the property of relation between the 
principal and adjunct, which is to be 
ascertained by considering whether they 
agree in nature and quality so as to be 
capable of union without incongruity, and 
is actually and directly necessary to the 
full enjoyment of the property.' [citing 
Barrett v. Bell, 82 Mo, 110-114, 52 Am. 
Rep. 361 
C a n £t iye saicj in 1-^ present instance that the 
seedhouse was absolutely essential and necessary 
to the conducting of the oil mill ? We think 
not. Certainly no one reading the description 
as set forth in the deed of trust upon which 
appellee's right is based could reasonably 
conclude that a seedhouse a number of miles in 
the country could be held to be an appurtenance 
t C" the lot. a in Giddings, upon which the oi ] m I ,1 1 
was situated. 
Id. at 1095. Under Texas Court of Civil Appeal's analysis in 
Baicax roperty is essential to the operations of Hie mine 
because the property, unlike ^e seedhouse, I he 
operation of the process of the mine. Without the Plant and Pond 
A H A X i II h i in il in i ? i l l i i i i i ' ill II i'« II i in in concentrate t o magnesium, 
however, the oil mill could operate without the seedhouse in 
Balcar. 
THIRD RULE 
The wording of S 59-5-3 should be read according to its 
literal wording, unless ii would be unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. The Utah supreme Cou^  L Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 
244 (Utah 1987), noted the manner *hich the courts construe 
enactments. The Supreme Court stated: 
In construing legislative enactments, we assume 
that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 p.2d 
445, 446 (Utah 1982). This Court therefore 
interprets and applies the statute according to 
• 1,1 
its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable. 
Horne, 737 P.2d at 247; accord Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 
449, 451 (Utah 1967). 
The -literal wording- of S 59-5-3 is not confusing or 
inoperable. The statute mandates the Tax Commission to tax AMAX, 
(or any other entity), if one or more of the following are met. 
First, if the property is "uponM the mine; second, if the 
property is "appurtenant" to the mine; or third, if the property 
is used exclusively for the purpose of reducing ore from a mine 
by the owner, even though it is not physically "appurtenant" to 
the mine. 
In the present fact situation the issue of whether AMAX's 
property, was "upon" the mine was not additional at the hearing 
before the Tax Commission. The Utah Code does not define the 
word "upon," however, the wording of the statute reflects the 
general definition of "upon," which means "on the surface: on 
it." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1296 (1985). As 
this issue wasnot raised it will not be advocated. 
Whether AMAX's property is "appurtenant" to has already been 
discussed in previous paragraphs. "Appurtenant" should mean 
"adjacent" or "adjunct*" See Brown v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 177 
N.Y.S. 618, 621 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1919) (quoting Century Dictionary). 
If, AMAX's property is not actually "appurtenant," then the 
next question that needs to be asked is whether AMAX's property 
is used exclusively for the purpose of reducing ores from a mine 
or mining claim by AMAX and thereby deemed "appurtenant." 
Section 59-5-3 in pertinent part provides: 
- u . 
For the purposes of/taxation all mills, 
reduction works, and smelters used exclusively 
for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores 
from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof 
shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine 
or mining claim though the same is not upon such 
mine or mining claim. 
This section of S 59-5-3 should be read literally because 
not confusing or inoperable. Determining whether statutory 
language start with I. he 
presumption that the statute is valid, and the words and phrases 
were chosen advisedly to express the legislative intent. The 
Utah Supreme Court in West Jordon v. Morrison, 656 I ' 2 1 < 1 15 (U t . 
1982), states this presumption in resolving the interpretation * 
We must assume that each term in the statute was 
used advisedly by the Legislature and that each 
should be interpreted and applied according to 
its usually accepted meaning. Where the 
ordinary meaning of the terms result in an 
application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction to the express purpose of the 
statute, it is not the duty of this Court to 
assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme. See 
e.g., Knox v. Thomas, 30 Utah 2d 15, 512 P.2d 
664 (1973); Gord, supra. 
accord H o m e , 7 3" ' i" "U ""in " i ; see general i y MIKI 1' 
Music, Inc. v. Snyder et al, 469 U.S. 153 (1985). Section 59-
nclear as to be wholly beyond reason, inoperable, 
contravention to some basic constitul: J, on i'ivjhl . Apply 
english sentence diagraming to determine the correct 
:I rit ,er pretatioi i of til E • -II list: sentence of S 59-5-3 it is clear 
AMAX's property is deemed appurtenant 
the sentence are "all mills reduction works and smelters.H 
m
 i reducing r it smelting the ores 
1 5 -
from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof" is a 
7 
restrictive clause that modifies the subjects of the sentence. 
This sentence means that the subjects, (i.e., all mills, 
reduction works, or smelters), used exclusively for the purpose 
of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by 
the owner of the subjects are deemed to be appurtenant to a mine 
or mining claim, even though it might not be upon a mine or 
mining claim. Therefore, AMAX's interpretation of the last 
o 
sentence of S 59-5-3 is incorrect. 
The statute as applied to the present fact situation means 
that AMAX property is "deemed to be appurtenant to a mine or 
mining claim." AMAX's property is used exclusively by AMAX for 
the purpose of reducing or smelting the brine from a mine or 
mining claim. As pointed out by Mr. Frazer of AMAX, the brine 
from Kaiser is the same brine (TR 142). All the brine used comes 
from the Great Salt Lake or the Great Salt Lake Desert. Section 
59-5-3 does not state that the mine or mining claim be owned by 
AMAX, just that the mill be used exclusively for reducing ores 
from a mine or mining claim. Therefore, since AMAX's property, 
(i.e., mill, etc.), is within the language of S 59-5-3 the 
Commission is mandated to assess its property. See Bd. of Educ. 
of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cty., 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). 
"Restrictive clauses are the so-called "bound- modifiers. They 
are absolutely essential to the meaning of the word or words they 
modify, they cannot be omitted without the meaning of the 
sentences being radically changed, and they are unpunctuated." 
Webster's Secretrarial Handbook 287 (1983). 
o 
AMAX's interpretation of the last sentence is found on page 15 
of the Petitioner's Brief filed with the Utah Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMENT II 
AMAX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 20% REDUCTION 
IN ITS TAXABLE VALUE. 
The Tax Commission's position on Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
4.5 in the present fact situation is that AMAX's property is not 
entitled to a 20% because AMAX's property does not fall within 
the statutory language of S 59-5-4.5. 
The Tax Commission is given the authority to tax 
property by the Utah Constitution. Section 11 of Article XIII 
provides that the "State Tax Commission shall administer and 
supervise the tax laws of the state. It shall assess mines and 
public utilities. . . . It shall have such other powers of 
original assessment as the Legislature may provide." Utah Const. 
art. XIII, S 11 (emphasis added). Pursuant to that authority the 
Legislature, through § 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986), has directed the Tax 
Commission to assess the following properties as they pertain to 
the following fact situation: 
[A]11 mines and mining claims • • . all 
machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims and the value of any 
surface use made or nonmetalliferous mining 
claims or mining property for other than 
mining purposes; must be assessed by the 
State Tax Commission as hereinafter provided 
. . . . All taxable property not required by 
the Constitution or by law to be assessed by 
the State Tax Commission must be assessed by 
the county assesor of the several counties in 
which the same is situated. For the purpose 
of taxation all mill, reduction works and 
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of 
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or 
mining claim by the owner thereof shall be 
deed to be appurtenant to mine or mining 
claim through same is not upon such mine or 
mining claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986). Pursuant to S 59-5-3 
statute the Tax Commission has assessed the tangible property of 
AMAX in this action. 
Section 59-5-4.5 provides in pertinent part a different 
standard for the county assessor to follow in assessing property; 
When the county assessor uses the 
comparable sales or cost appraisal method in 
valuing taxable property for assessment 
purposes, the assessor is required to 
recognized that various fees, services, 
closing costs, and other expanses related to 
the transaction lessen the actual amount that 
may be received in the transaction. The 
county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of 
the value based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisal of the property as its reasonable 
fair cash value for pusposes of assessment. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (1986). No similar reduction is 
allowed under S 59-5-3, the statute which directs the Tax 
Commission to assess ••mines". Furthermore, § 59-5-1 requires the 
Tax Commission to assess AMAX's property at 100% of its fair 
market value. Section 59-5-1 in pertinent part provides, "All 
taxable property, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be 
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value." Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-5-1 (1986). 
AMAX, presumably under the equal protection argument, 
claims: 
It is obvious that nothing except the 
formal classification of the Plant and the 
Ponds as "centrally assessed" supports the 
nonapplicability of U.C.A. S 59-5-4.5 to 
AMAX. AMAX is denied the benefit of a 20% 
deduction in calculating the "reasonable fair 
cash value of its property simply because 
that property is assessed by a state rather 
than a county employee, and includes 
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personal as well as real property. As a 
result, AMAX has been required "to shoulder 
an unfair portion of the taxesH in violation 
of the "requirement of uniformity". 
Petitioner's Brief at 42, AMAX Magnesium Corporation v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251 (Utah 1988). An initial 
problem with AMAX's claim is that there are no distinctions made 
between similarly situated property owners. AMAX, as a centrally 
assessed property owner, is treated uniformly and equally with 
all other centrally assessed property owners. In essence, AMAX 
wants preferential treatment which other state assessed taxpayers 
do not and have never received. It is unconstitutional to grant 
preferential treatment to similarly situated property owners. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Rio Algom Corporation v. 
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), stated that the 
Constitution requires uniform assessment, however, the Supreme 
Court recognized that there was not a single formula to assess 
properties because of the nature of the properties being taxed. 
The Supreme Court stated: 
Under Article XIII, S 3, the property 
taxes paid on each property are required to 
have a uniform proportion to the value of the 
property. Although the objective is easily 
stated, its attainment is more difficult. 
Because of the many different kinds of 
property and the various factors that affect 
their value, the determination of what 
constitutes equal Hin proportion to the value 
of his, her or its tangible property," under 
Article XII, § 3, cannot be made by 
application of any property single formula. 
Of primary importance is the 
determination of what valuation methods 
should be utilized, and that depends on the 
nature of the properties to be taxed. 
Residential commercial, transportation, 
mining, and public utilities, etc., must 
be treated differently because of the 
economic condititons that give value to such 
properties• 
Id. at 188. 
AMAX, a a centrally assessed property, is complaining 
that it is not treated as county-assessed property. Were AMAX to 
receive a 20% reduction, then there would be preferential 
treatment of AMAX's property. The Tax Commission would have to 
revise all of the centrally assessed poperty assessments to avoid 
running afoul of the constitutional guarantees AMAX claims are 
applicable. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Rio Algom 
Corporation recognized that county assessed and centrally 
assessed properties are not similarly situated properties because 
different economic factors are operative upon them. Moreover, 
the Utah Supreme Court addresses the legislative intent to create 
uniformity by enacting the statutes in question, i.e., S 59-5-3 
and S 59-5-4.5. Because of those differences, AMAX's comparsion 
between county-assessed and centrally assessed properties is 
strained. It is a comparison of incomparables, rather than 
comparables. The Tax Commisssion, even assuming AMAX's claim had 
merit, does not have the authority to declare sections 59-5-4.5 
unconstitutional because it does not give centrally assessed 
property a 20% reduction; nor does the Tax Commission have the 
consitutional authority to extend the coverage of section 59-5-
4.5 to centrally assessed properites. 
Further, assuming that the Utah Supreme Court could 
declare section 59-5-4.5 unconstitutional (because it did not 
give a 20% reduction to centrally assessed real property), AMAX 
would not thereby be entitled to a 20% reduction. It is a well 
established rule of constituional law that the judiciary does not 
supplant the legislature when passing upon the constitutional 
validity of statutes. The judiciary's prerogative is to declare 
that a given statute is unconsitutional. The legislature must 
then either rewrite the statute or let the declaration of 
unconstitutionality stand. As explained by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court: 
The assertion that Rule 71.1, supra, can be 
interpreted to have directly repealed §§ 24-
9-101, et seq., also seems to stray beyond 
the bounds of this court's power to 
supersede acts of the legislature. We are 
empowered to make rules that are procedural 
in nature. Sections 24-9-101 et seq., 
create a substantive and jurisdictional 
right that our rule-making powers cannot 
change. To do so would be to usurp a power 
clearly vested in the legislature. This 
court cannot legislate by repealing that 
section. 
McGuire v. McGuiref 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 (Wyo. 1980) (emhasis 
added)• 
In Rio Algom the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of section 59-5-4.5 against an equal protection 
challenge brought by centrally assessed property owners who 
claimed the statue was unconstitutional as applied to them. As 
framed by the Supreme Court, the arguement was that section 59-5-
4.5 effects unconstitutional "discriminationw against centrally 
assessed taxpayers, in violation of Article XIII sections 2 and 3 
21-
of the Utah Constitution. In answer to the defendant's claim, 
the Rio Algom Court stated: 
[A] certain degree of de facto 
classification is unavoidable. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the basic constitutional 
objective of uniformity, there are many de 
facto classifications that result from the 
various valuation formulae utilized for 
estimating market value. 
Id. at 191. The Court continued to explain another reason for 
dismissing the challenge against section 59-5-4.5, which was that 
the legislature may meet the constituional requirements of 
uniformity under Article XIII of the Utah Constitution in any 
rational way it deems proper. The legislature may find that the 
local taxation scheme was discriminatory or in the words of the 
Court "the Legislature may redress the imbalances and inequities 
created." Id. at 193. 
AMAX's arguments simply resurrect an argument the Utah 
Supreme Court has already considred and dismissed. AMAX attempts 
to distinguish Rio Algom on the basis that AMAX comes before the 
Court with a factual record, whereas, "Rio Algom was decided 
without a factual record." Petitioner's Brief at 33-34, AMAX 
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, No. 88-0251 (Utah 
1988). If this argument is accepted it would undermine the very 
These provisions of the Utah Constitution as amended in 
1983 are substantially the same as they were under the 1969 
constitution in effect when Rio Algom was filed. However, the 
present Article XIII includes subsection 2(10) which provides 
that "Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as 
property or it may be taxed as property in such manner and to 
such extent as the Legislature may provide . . . ." The 
Legislature under the Utah Constitution in effect, when Amax 
filed the present appeal had and has plenary power to tax or 
exempt intangible property as it deemed appropriate. 
rationale for the Rio Alqom decision, which is that the 
legislature has plenary power in making such distinctions. The 
Legislature makes a distinction between centrally assessed and 
county assessed properties. The Supreme Court in Rio Algom 
affirms the distinction as a constitutionally valid by stating: 
Futhermore, the Legislature was justified 
in enacting S 59-5-4.5 for another reason. 
The Legislature acted on the premise that the 
then-existing property tax scheme in the 
state was discriminatory because it required 
county-assessed taxpayers to shoulder an 
unfair portion of the taxes and violated the 
requirment of uniformity. The Legislature 
was well aware, as the legislative history of 
both challenged acts unequivocally 
demonstrates, that there had been a large 
shift of the property tax burden from state-
assessed properties to county-assessed 
properties as a result of inflation. 
Certainly the Legislature may not 
establish formal classifications of property 
that result in nonuniform or disproportionate 
tax burdens. But the Legislature may seek to 
enforce the uniformity requirement of S 3 by 
attempting to equalize the tax burden borne 
by those taxpayers who pay a greater tax in 
proportion to the value of their property 
than others. 
Id. at 193. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "Judicial 
deference is usually accorded an agency's interpretation of a 
statute which the agency is charged with enforcing." Concerned 
Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982). 
The Court has further held that "Where the language of a statute 
indicates a legislative intention to commit broad discretion to 
an agency to effectuate the purposes of a legislative scheme, 
this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as long as the agency's interpretation has warrant in the 
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record and a reasonable basis in the law." Hodges v. Western 
Piling and Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986)at 720. The 
Utah State Tax Commission has the responsibility of enforcing S 
59-5-3. The legislature granted the Commission broad discretion 
in enforcing the tax laws of the State. Through a process of 
delegation the Property Tax Division has been assigned the task 
of enforcing the State's tax laws. The Auditing Division has 
enforced S 59-5-3 in accordance with its wording by assessing 
AMAX's property. 
AMAX is also wrong in suggesting that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution and similar 
provisons of the state constitution preclude distinctions between 
different classes of taxpayers. The Utah Supreme Court in Rio 
Algom embraced and reaffirmed the general rule that the 
legislature, with respect to taxation statues, specifically 
including property taxation, has wide latitude in making 
distinctions. Justice Stewart, writing for Rio Algom Court 
stated: 
Although we are concerned here with the 
constitutionality of S 59-5-4.5 under Article 
XII of the Utah Constitution, what has been 
stated by the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to tax statutes challenged under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is relevant to the instant problem. 
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 2 (1973), the Court stated: 
No scheme of taxation, whether the 
tax is imposed on property, income, 
or purchases of goods and services, 
has yet been devised which is free of 
all discriminatory impact. In such a 
complex arena in which no perfect 
alternatives exist, the Court does 
well not to impose too rigorous a 
* j 
standard or scrutiny lest all local 
fiscal schemes become subject of 
criticism under the Equal Protecction 
Clause. 
Id. at 191 (emphasis added). If AMAX prevailed in its Equal 
Protection-type arguements, state and local fiscal schemes would 
be totally disrupted. Moreover, as the Rio Algom Court also 
explained, the legislature has wide prerogative permitting a 20% 
reduction for "transaction costs" in valuing county assessed 
property, but denying the same reduction to centrally assessed 
property. See id. at 193. Since Rio Algom, the state 
constitution has been amended to give the legislature plenary 
power to tax or not tax intangibles, as it sees fit. 
Furthermore, none of the cases AMAX cites in support of 
the proposition that the equal protection clause of the federal 
constituion mandates absolute uniformity and parity in taxation 
statutes are applicable. All the cases AMAX cites are cases 
involving dicrimination against similarly situated taxpayers. 
For example, Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 
(1946), which was cited by AMAX for the proposition that, "the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the 
individual from state action that selects him out for 
discriminatory treatement by sixbjecting him to taxes not imposed 
on others of the same class." Petitioner's Brief at 43-44, AMAX 
Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251 
(Utah 1988). Likewise, Maricopa County v. North Central 
Development Co., 566 P.2d 688 (Ariz. App. 1977), involved 
See footnote 9 on page 22. 
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discrimination between various "construction projects . . . .M 
Id. at 44. And Ernest W. Hahn# Inc. v. County Assessor/ 592 P.2d 
965 (1975), involved discrimination between various properties 
valued by the county. See Id. 
The cases AMAX cites all involve discrimination between 
similarly situated individuals. AMAX's constitutional analysis 
is confused in the present case because county assessed property 
and centrally assessed property are not in the same class or 
grouping. See Rio Alqom Corporation/ 681 P.2d at 190. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion/ AMAX's arguments for claiming a 20% 
reduction in valuation of its property are not justified under 
the Utah Constituion, Utah Code Annotated, nor case law. 
Likewise, the Commission's decision to assess AMAX's 
property as "appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim should not be 
overruled. Section 59-5-3 therefore is the statute to apply to 
AMAX's property that was correctly determined to be property 
subject to central assessment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IT day of December, 
1988. 
DAVID L WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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Appendix 1: AMAX Magnesium v. Property Tax Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, No. 86-0203, at 4 (December 
21, 1987). 
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PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ) 
Respondent. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 86 0203 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
(Tax Commission) for a Formal Hearing on June 4, 1987. Blaine 
Davis, and Joe Pacheco, Commissioners, heard the matter the Tax 
Commission, and Mark K. Buchi represented the Petitioner. 
Maxwell A. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, represented the 
Respondent. 
Originally the Property Tax Division valued Petitioner 
for the 1986 tax year at $84,332,150. That value was lowered 
to $78,312,895 based upon a revision of the personal property 
values. At the informal hearing, the Tax Commission issued a 
decision sustaining the division's taxable value of $78,312,895. 
The Petitioner argued that further adjustments should 
be made based upon economic and functional obsolescence. In 
addition, the Petitioner argues that the property should 
bevalued by the local authorities, i.e., Tooele County instead 
Appeal No. 86-r 73 
of the Centrally Assessed Section of the Property Tax Division 
and that the value should be reduced by 20%. 
The Respondent argues that $78,312,895 is the 
appropriate market value of the subject property as of the lien 
date. The Respondent further supports its assessment on the 
grounds that it is appurtenant to a mine, i.e., the Great Salt 
Lake, and therefore, is properly assessed by the Property Tax 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission instead of by the 
local assessor of Tooele County and not eligible for the 20% 
reduction in value for tax purposes. 
The parties submitted evidence with regard to their 
respective arguments. Based upon the evidence submitted at the 
hearing the Tax Commission makes these Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The tax year in question is 1986. 
2. The lien date for the determination of market 
value for the subject property is January l, 1986. 
3. The subject property was assessed by the Property 
Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (59-2-201). 
4. The subject property consists of (a) a facility 
for processing magnesium which consists of personal property, 
improvements, and real property (the Plant) (b) a series of 
evaporative ponds consisting of improvements and equipment 
located on leased land owned by the state of Utah and various 
federal agencies (the Ponds). 
5. Only four magnesium production plants exist in 
the entire world. 
6. Magnesium is extracted through various chemical 
and electrical processes from brine containing magnesium 
chloride. 
7. Production from the facility depends on the 
existence of a large supply of brine for processing. 
8. The ponds are a series of earth dikes with 
improvements and equipment in which, through a seven year 
process of evaporation, salt water is converted to brine. 
9. Since 1983, the ponds have not produced 
sufficient brine to supply the needs of the plant. Therefore, 
the Petitioner has purchased a portion of the brine from 
outside suppliers. 
10. The equipment used in the harvesting and 
extraction process is subject to the corrosive nature of the 
salt. However, the equipment is made resistant by using 
special metals and paints. Therefore, the equipment does not 
necessarily have a shorter life than normal mining equipment. 
11. Petitioner, by its processes, is obtaining metal 
products from the brine and, therefore, is effectively "mining" 
brine from the Great Salt Lake and then extracting the mineral 
magnesium from the salt brine. 
12. The plant is located approximately 15 miles from 
the Ponds and the brine is transported from the Ponds to the 
Plant for processing. 
13. The dikes were raised and strengthened prior to 
the lien date to preclude them from being breached by the 
rising Great Salt Lake. These expenditures for raising and 
- - OOG00335 
strengthening are expenses and not capital improvements, and 
should not to be added to the Plant value. 
14. The argument of the Petitioner that the breach of 
the dike was a forseeable inevitability that should result in 
economic obsolescence being given on the lien date is not 
supported by competent evidence. The Tax Commission 
acknowledges that post-lien date events that are forseeable may 
affect value. However, the issue of forseeability goes only to 
the discount a willing buyer would ask because cf that 
forseeable event taking place. It does not mean that on the 
lien date an assumption is made that the event has already 
taken place and the value is reduced accordingly. In this 
particular case, the Petitioner has failed to present 
sufficient evidence as to what this forseeability discount 
might be. Therefore, no reduction is granted. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 59-5-4.5 allows a 20% reduction in market 
value to property which is locally assessed. The language of 
the section does not apply to property which is centrally 
assessed such as the subject property. Such non-application of 
the exemption to the centrally assessed property is not 
unconstitutional. Rio Algom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184. 
2. For 1986, the subject plant is appurtenant to the 
mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake, ponds from which the minerals 
were extracted. It is, therefore, subject to central 
assessment under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3. If the plant were 
used exclusively to produce magnesium from brine purchased from 
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outside suppliers it would not be appurtenant to the mine from 
which the minerals were extracted, and it would be subject to 
assessment by local authorities. 
3. The raising of the dike and the maintenance of 
the dike is an expense and not a capital improvement. 
Therefore, those costs are to be expensed and not added to the 
value of the plant. 
4. Unpersuasive legal authority has been presented 
to the Commission to support an argument for a reduction in 
value due to the foreseeability of impacts from the rising lake 
after the lien date. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, it is the Decision and Order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission that the Respondent adjust its records to 
reflect that the expense of dike maintenance should not be 
included as a capital investment . The balance of the 
assessment is affirmed. ^ 
DATED this JJ^ day of /yAJ^^yt£lStJ , 1987. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
R.H. Hansen 
Lirman 
B. P&checo G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner Commissioner 
NOTICE: it is hereby given that you have 30 days from the 
date of mailing of this decision to appeal to the Tax Court 




Appendix 2: Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(10); Utah Const, art. 
XIII, § 3(1); Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Art. XEI, § 2 
ARTICLE XIII 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascer-
tained — Exemption of state and municipal prop-
erty — Exemption of tangible personal property 
held for sale or processing — Exemption of prop-
erty used for irrigating land — Exemption of 
property used for electrical power — Remittance 
or abatement of taxes of poor — Exemption of 
residential and household property — Disabled 
veterans' exemption — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state*] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
Alt. X m , § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for 
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the 
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as may be provided by law. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of 
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the mili-
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation. 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there 
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
coNsnnmoN OF UTAH 
ARTICLE XIII 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Art. X m , § 3 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the 
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE XIII 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
ART. XIII, § 11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 11. [Creation of State Tax Commission—Membership—Governor to 
appoint—Terms—Duties—County boards—Duties.] 
There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not 
more than two of whom shall belong to the same political party. The mem-
bers of the Commission shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the 
consent of the Senate, for such terms of office as may be provided by law. 
The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the tax laws of 
the State. It shall assess mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize 
the valuation and assessment of property among the several counties. It 
shall have such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature may 
provide. Under such regulations in such cases and within such limitations 
as the Legislature may prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues, re-
vise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment 
and valuation of property within the counties. The duties imposed upon 
the State Board of Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of this 
State shall be performed by the State Tax Commission. 
In each couiity of this State there shall be a County Board of Equaliza-
tion consisting of the Board of County Commissioners of said county. The 
County Boards of Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of the real and personal property within their respective coun-
ties, subject to such regulation and control by the State Tax Commission 
as may be prescribed by law. The State Tax Commission and the County 
Boards of Equalization shall each have such other powers as may be pre-
scribed by the Legislature. (As amended November 4, 1912, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1913; November 4, 1930, effective January 1, 1931; November 4, 
1958, effective January 1,1959.) 
Appendix 3: Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602(3) (1987); Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 
(1986); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1)(1986); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(3)(ii) (1988). 
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59-1-602. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of 
district court — Waiver — Review by Supreme 
Court [Effective until January 1, 1988]. 
(1) Within 30 days after notice of any decision by the commission rendered 
after a formal hearing before it, any aggrieved party appearing before the 
commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may 
appeal or petition for review to the tax division of the district court located in 
the county of residence or principal place of business of the affected taxpayer 
or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to 
the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County. 
(2) In all cases, whether or not proper under Subsection (1), any aggrieved 
party appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are 
affected by the decision may appeal or petition for review a decision rendered 
after a formal hearing of the commission to the Tax Division of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County within the specified 30 
days following notice of such decision. 
(3) In the alternative, a taxpayer may waive review and trial de novo in the 
tax division of the district court and, within the specified 30 days following 
the required notice, may seek review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ of 
certiorari. If a taxpayer or any affected county chooses to waive right of re-
view by the tax division of the district court and applies for a writ in the 
Supreme Court, the taxpayer or affected county shall (a) state in the applica-
tion for the writ that the taxpayer or affected county is waiving the right of 
review and trial de novo in the tax division of the district court, and (b) 
comply with § 59-5-112 as though seeking review in the tax division of the 
district court. A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being 
reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the 
Supreme Court. 
59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property — Residential 
property — School district unmet need compu-
tations — County registration of aircraft [Effec-
tive until January 1,1988]. 
(1) (a) All taxable property, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be 
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value. That value shall be 
reported on the tax notice mailed to the property owner as provided in 
§ 59-10-10. 
(b) Adjustments, on forms prescribed by the tax commission under 
Subsection 59-5-46(4), shall be made to the reasonable cash value to 
reduce the value 25% on residential property for tax purposes. For 
purposes of the adjustment, residential property means any property 
used for residential purposes as a primary residence. Property used for 
transient residential use and condominiums used in rental pools shall 
not qualify for the residential exemption. No more than one acre of 
land per residential unit shall qualify for the residential exemption. 
Land and the improvements thereon shall be separately assessed. 
School district unmet need computations for critical school building aid 
shall be determined as though the bonding capacity had not been in-
creased because of changes in the assessment rate. 
(2) Aircraft required to be registered with the state through the county 
in which the aircraft is located shall be taxed in accordance with the uni-
form tax established under § 59-5-1.5. 
59-5-3. Assessment by State Tax Commission — Proper-
ties assessed by, enumerated [Effective until 
January 1,1988]. 
W-5-3. Assessment by state tax commission—Properties assessed by, 
ttmnerated.—Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and irrigation 
works, bridges and ferries, and the property of car and transportation 
companies, when they are operated as a unit in more than one county; all 
property of public utilities whether operated within one county or more; 
all mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous mines based 
on three times the annual net proceeds thereof as provided in section 
59-5-57, and all other mines and mining claims and other valuable deposits, 
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals 
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person other than the 
owner of such minerals, all machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and 
the value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or 
mining property for other than mining purposes; must be assessed by the 
state tax commission as hereinafter provided. All taxable property not 
required by the Constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax com-
mission must be assessed by the county assessor of the several counties in 
which the same is situated. For the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction 
works and smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or 
smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof shall 
be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining claim though the 
same is not upon such mine or mining claim. 
59*5-4.5. Recognition of expenses in using comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method. 
(1) When the county assesor uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal 
method in valuing taxable property for assessment purposes, the assessor is 
required to recognize that various fees, services, closing costs, and other 
expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual amount that may be 
received in the transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% 
of the value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as 
its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment. 
(2) (a) Prior to January 1,1988, the State Tax Commission shall develop 
and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing 
taxable property for assessment purposes which provide that the vari-
ous fees, services, closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales 
transaction and other intangible values are not included as part of the 
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment. 
(b) Beginning January 1 1988, the provisions of Subsection (1) do 
not apply to county assessors using the sales or cost appraisal method 
in valuing taxable property for assessment purposes. For assessments 
beginning January 1, 1988, the State Tax Commission shall by rule 
order county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost appraisal 
methods which are required to be developed and implemented in Sub-
section (2)(a) in place of the requirement of Subsection (1). 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; * 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
c o n t . . . 
Appendix 4: Illustrative Maps. 
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